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While new conventional wisdom warns that developing countries should be aware of the risks of
premature capital account liberalization, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received
much less attention. This paper investigates the negative effects of exchange controls on trade. To
minimize evasion of controls, countries often intensify inspections at the border and increase documentation
requirements. Thus, the cost of conducting trade rises. The paper finds that a one standard-deviation
increase in the controls on trade payment has the same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff
by about 14 percentage points. A one standard-deviation increase in the controls on FX transactions
reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff by 11 percentage points. Therefore, the collateral
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Since the emerging market crisis of the 1990s, a new conventional wisdom has emerged that 
developing countries should be alert to the adverse effects of premature capital account 
liberalizations (see Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; and other papers reviewed by Prasad, 
Rogoff, Wei, and Kose, 2003). In comparison, the costs of not removing exchange controls 
have received much less attention in empirical research. A notable exception is a study by 
Forbes (2002) which estimated the effect of Chile’s capital controls (“encaje”) in the early 
1990s on the cost of borrowing faced by its medium-sized publicly-listed firms. 
 
In this paper, we estimate another possible collateral damage of exchange controls, namely 
their effects on international trade, and compare them to those of tariff and other non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs). The study was motivated in part by a conversation we had some years ago 
with the chief of the national foreign exchange control administration of a country which 
shall remain anonymous. As the country was on a fixed exchange rate regime (and any 
change in the regime was to be decided by the government cabinet rather than by the foreign 
exchange control administration) and by then had permitted current account convertibility of 
its currency, we asked the chief why his bureau needed to have a large staff nationally. The 
response was that it was common for firms and individuals to try to circumvent capital 
account restrictions by mis-invoicing imports, exports or both, and his staff had to implement 
various inspections to minimize such leakages. It dawned on us that attempts to enforce 
exchange controls have most likely raised the cost for firms to engage in exports and imports. 
How much extra cost these controls effectively impose on international trade is the subject of 
the current research reported here. 
 
The paper combines three unique panel data sets: (a) a detailed description (192 indicators) 
of the exchange controls for up to 184 countries since 1996 in the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) database; (b) importer-
partner country- specific tariff rates from the UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Information 
System (TRAIN), retrieved via the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) at the IMF; and 
(c) a rating of the extent of non-tariff barriers from the IMF’s Trade Restrictiveness Index    3  
 
database. These data are then combined with bilateral trade data from the IMF’s Direction of 
Trade database as well as additional control variables from other sources. The econometric 
specification is grounded in the theory of trade volume, including recent development in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2005). 
 
To our knowledge, Tamirisa (1999) was the first and the only other paper that studied the 
effect of exchange restrictions on trade. Due to data limitation, her sample covers only one 
year (1996) and 40 countries. Perhaps more importantly, the estimation was based on a mis-
specified model as it did not incorporate separate importer and exporter fixed effects which 
are required of by economic theory. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show 
that the omission of these fixed effects has artificially generated the so-called “border effect” 
in trade volume. Subramanian and Wei (forthcoming) show that the inclusion of the fixed 
effects can reverse Rose’s (2004) conclusion on the ineffectiveness of the WTO in promoting 
trade. It is therefore important to specify the trade volume equation in a way that is consistent 
with economic theories. 
 
Due to the comprehensive descriptions of the exchange controls in the AREAER database 
since 1996, we are able to construct separate indicators for (a) controls on proceeds from 
exports and payments for imports, (b) controls on capital transactions, and (c) controls on 
foreign exchange (FX) transactions and other items not specific to goods trade or capital 
transactions. Note that the phrases “capital controls” and “exchange controls” are used 
interchangeably in this paper as they refer to all three categories of controls, not just those on 
capital transactions. A narrower definition of “capital controls” may include only controls on 
capital transactions plus controls on most FX transactions. According to Johnson, Kochhar, 
Mitton and Tamirisa (2006), several capital control measures adopted in Malaysia during the 
Asian financial crisis were not targeted at specific capital transactions, but at all FX 
transactions.  
 
To preview the main findings, we will report economically and statistically significant 
evidence of negative effects of exchange controls on trade. In particular, a one standard 
deviation increase in the controls on export receipts and import payments is found to have the    4  
 
same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff by 8.7 to 13.9 percentage points, 
depending on the model specifications. A one standard deviation increase in the controls on 
FX transactions reduces trade by the same amount as a rise in tariff by 10.8 to 11.3 
percentage points. When a case study of the emerging markets during 1996-99 is examined, 
we find that those countries with greater increases in the controls on capital transactions also 
experienced greater falls in their trade (after taking into account their output contractions). To 
summarize, exchange controls effectively work as a form of non-tariff barriers to trade even 
though they have not been typically characterized as NTBs in the literature. We conclude that 
the collateral damage of imposing exchange controls in terms of foregone trade is sizable. 
 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section II describes some basic patterns regarding the 
exchange controls across countries and over time. Section III presents the statistical analysis. 
Section IV Concludes. 
 
II. Exchange Controls: Some Basic Patterns 
 
The IMF’s AREAER database uses up to 192 indicators – listed in an appendix - to track the 
exchange controls for individual member countries from 1996. We divide these controls into 
three broad categories and construct an index for each category. Each index ranges from 0 to 
1, reflecting the proportion of the indicators in each category that have controls in place. The 
three categories are: 
 
•  Controls on payments for imports and proceeds from exports. They cover 35 controls 
that explicitly target transactions related to international trade, including requirements 
for a foreign exchange budget for imports, and documentation and financing 
requirements for import payments and export proceeds.  
 
•  Controls on capital transactions. They cover 86 controls on transactions of capital 
and money market instruments, derivatives, FDI, credit operations, real estates, and 
personal finance. They also include controls on the operation of institutional investors 
and commercial banks.     5  
 
 
•  Controls on FX transactions and other items that are not exclusively on trade or 
capital transactions. They include exchange taxes and subsidies, ban on currency 
derivative trading, controls on bank accounts, currency requirements for pricing and 
settlements, current transfers and invisible transactions, and trade in gold and 
banknotes. 
Figure 1: Evolutions of Restriction Indices
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On average, as Table 1a and Figure 1 indicate, countries tend to have more controls on 
capital transactions and foreign exchange transactions than on trade payments. Furthermore, 
all three indices show a moderate decline during the period from 1996 to 2005. The average 
index value for controls on capital transactions dropped from 0.49 in 1996 to 0.45 in 2005. 
The index for controls on trade payments, and that for FX transactions, also declined from 
0.30 to 0.24, and from 0.35 to 0.31, respectively, during the same period. Countries with 
more controls in one category are also likely to have more controls in the other categories, as 
indicated by the pair wise correlations of about 0.67-0.76 (Table 1b).  
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The average values of the indices mask substantial cross-country heterogeneity and time-
series variations for many countries. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 presents the patterns for 
three developing countries on two continents (Brazil, Chile, and Malaysia) and one OECD 
member country (Greece). Each has experienced substantial changes in the controls during 
the sample period.  
 
Brazil first tightened controls on capital transactions and foreign exchange transactions in the 
1990s, but then liberalized dramatically in 2002.   Its controls on trade payments fluctuate a 
bit, with a generally downward trend. Chile’s story is equally dramatic. While it started off 
with a fairly restrictive regime on capital transactions, with a value of 0.75 for the relevant 
index in 1996, major reforms in 2001/2002 removed more than half of the controls, including 
those on transactions of equity, bonds, real estate, and direct investment. This results in a 
decline in the index value to 0.19 by 2005. During the same period, Chile also removed some 
controls on trade payments, though there were relatively few of them to begin with. 
Figure 2. Control Indices in Selected Countries
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Greece exhibits two major episodes of liberalization of the controls on FX transactions in 
1997 and 2001 with modest reforms in other years. Virtually all controls on FX transactions 
had been removed by 2005. Controls on capital transactions loosened more gradually over 
time. While Malaysia reduced its controls on trade payments in the mid-1990s, it tightened 
its controls on capital transactions during the Asian financial crisis, through introducing new 
controls on the transactions of bonds, derivatives, real estate, and other debt instruments by 
nonresidents. The index for controls on capital transactions jumped from 0.61 in 1997 to 0.69 
in 1998, climbing further to 0.75 by 2004. Some of these controls have been removed or 
loosened since 2001, but these changes apparently are not fully reflected in the database. 
 
The variations across countries and over time will prove helpful in identifying the effects of 
exchange controls on international trade in empirical specifications with country and year 
fixed effects. It is important to point out, however, that as measures of exchange controls, 
these indices are not perfect either. First, the AREAER database only reflects the presence or 
absence of specific exchange restrictions on the book, but not the degree of enforcement on 
the ground. Second, in spite of up to 192 indicators to describe the controls, for any given 
indicator, the intensity of the controls is not well captured by the database. In light of these 
shortcomings, the statistical findings should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the 
AREAER database may be the only source that covers the near universe of the countries and 
codes the controls in a consistent way across countries.  
 
III. Statistical Analysis 
 
We now turn to the regression analysis. Starting with an explanation of the benchmark 
specification and the data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers, we move to reporting some basic 
results and computing the tariff equivalents of the exchange controls. We then discuss a 
number of extensions including a case study of the emerging markets’ experience during the 
financial crisis episode of the late 1990s. 
    8  
 
Specification 
An augmented gravity model is utilized to study the effect of exchange controls on trade. The 
gravity model is one of the most successful empirical models in economics, as it is capable of 
explaining a large fraction of the variations in observed volumes of international trade, with 
adjusted R-squares of 70% or higher. It has also been applied to analyze the effects of a 
variety of policies on trade.
1 The specification used in this paper incorporates recent 
theoretical insights from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein (HMR, 2005). It allows us to compute a tariff-equivalent measure of the exchange 
controls in terms of their effects on trade. To be precise, the benchmark model is specified in 
the following form: 
 
Yi,j,t =  α1 IMPi  +  α2 EXPj + α3 Yeart + Xi,j,t β  
+ Restriction-Indicesi,t γ + δ Tariffi,j,t + η NTBi,t + εi,j,t   (1) 
 
The dependent variable  ,, ijt Y  is country i’s log imports from country j in year t. The key 
variables of interests are the three restriction indices, the tariff rates, and the NTB index. In 
addition, , ij IMP , , ij EXP , and  t YEAR  are the importer, exporter, and year fixed effects, 
respectively.  ,, ijt X  is a list of variables that previous studies have found significant in 
explaining the volume of trade, including log GDP, great circle distance between i and j, 
dummies for common language, colonial links, and shared borders. Following Helpman, 
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2005), we also include a Mills ratio and another HMR variable to 
correct for the non-random presence of zero trade and intra-sector firm heterogeneity.  
 
The importer and exporter fixed effects are meant to capture the “remoteness” terms in Wei 
(1996) or the “multilateral resistance” terms in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Note, 
however, that we are not able to include time-varying country fixed effects as that will render 
it impossible to identify the effects of exchange controls (which are part of the time-varying 
                                                 
1 See Frankel and Wei (1993) and Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1997) on free trade areas, Rose (2004) and 
Subramanian and Wei (2003) on the WTO, among others.    9  
 
country-specific factors). As an extension, we will use a specification that includes time-
varying import-price index for exporters and importers separately. In addition, we will 
examine a specification that includes (non-time-varying) country-pair fixed effects which are 
also more general than the importer/exporter fixed effects. 
 
Data 
The sample includes 142 countries for which information about trade flows, tariff rates, the 
nontariff barrier index, and exchange controls are available. A list of these countries is 
provided in Appendix 2. As will be clear, this paper concludes that many of the exchange 
controls are effectively non-tariff barriers in terms of their effects on trade. However, 
conventionally measured NTBs in the literature do not usually include exchange controls. 
For comparison, we adopt a separate measure of the NTBs in the traditional sense of the 
phrase based on the IMF’s Trade Restrictiveness Index database. The index takes a value of 
1, 2 or 3, depending on the coverage ratio or other dimensions of non-tariff barriers to trade. 
According to the IMF (2005), the index takes the value of one if NTBs are absent or minor in 
a country (i.e., less than one percent of production or trade are subject to NTBs). A rating of 
2 implies that NTBs are significant, applied to at least one important sector, and affecting up 
to 25 percent of production or trade. A rating of 3 means that NTBs are relevant for many 
sectors or an entire stages of production, affecting more than 25 percent of production or 
trade. In the IMF database, the NTB index takes the value of 2 for a large number of country-
years. So a rise in the index’s value from one to two, or from two to three, represents a fairly 
significant increase in the extent of non-tariff barriers. 
 
The tariff rate for a given country pair in a given year is a simple average of the applicable 
tariff rates across all tariff lines for that importer and that specific trading partner (so that 
members of a free trade area would face different tariffs from non-members). 
 
Benchmark results 
We now turn to the regression results which are reported in Table 2. The first three 
regressions include the three exchange control indices one by one. The controls on trade 
payments have a strong adverse effect on trade. The point estimate for γ is -0.57, and is    10  
 
highly significant. The coefficient for controls on capital transactions is negative but 
insignificant. The estimate for controls on FX transactions is -0.31 and significant at the 10 
percent level. Note that all standard errors are clustered by importer-exporter country pairs
2. 
 
Most other regressors are significant and with intuitive signs. In particular, the estimate for 
tariff rates is -0.71 and highly significant, which implies that increasing tariff by 10 
percentage points is associated with a 7.1 percent reduction in trade. The estimate for NTB 
index is -0.22 and also highly significant. This implies that a one-step increase in the NTB 
index would have equivalent effect on trade as a 30 percentage points increase in tariff rates. 
GDP, distance, dummies for border, colonial ties, and common language are all significant 
and consistent with the previous literature. Trade between two WTO members is about 38 
percent higher, while the trade between a WTO member and a non-member is about 17 
percent lower.  
 
Column 4 in Table 2 provides estimates when all three restriction indices are included in one 
regression. The point estimate for the controls on trade payments remains significant at -0.54. 
Controls on capital transactions is still insignificant. The coefficient for FX transactions 
became insignificant, although it still shows a negative sign. Estimates for all other variables 
are virtually unchanged.  
 
The model allows us to conduct a tariff equivalent calculation for the exchange controls. 
Take Column 4 in Table 2 as an example. As the standard deviation of the controls on trade 
payments is 0.19, an increase in this type of controls by one standard deviation would have 
the same negative effect on trade as raising tariff rate by 100*0.19*0.54/0.72=14.3 
percentage points.  
 
                                                 
2 When the standard errors are clustered by importers rather than importer-exporter pairs, some standard gravity 
variables such as log of importer’s GDP as well as the three exchange controls lose statistical significance. This 
suggests that clustering by importers may be an overkill if one’s prior is that the standard gravity variables 
should be significant. For this reason, we choose to cluster by importer-exporter pairs. Note that the importer 
fixed effects already take into account an important source of common variations across variables for any given 
importer.     11  
 
We also implement a set of regressions with country pair fixed effects, which are more 
general than importer/exporter fixed effects. The results are shown in columns 5 to 8 of Table 
2. When the restriction indices are included one by one, the results are similar qualitatively as 
before: the coefficients on both controls on trade payments and FX transactions are negative 
and significant, while that on controls on capital transactions remains insignificant. When all 
three indices are included together, the estimate for controls on trade payments becomes -
0.37 and significant, while controls on FX transactions increases to -0.35. The coefficient for 
tariff rates is now -0.78 and significant. These estimates imply that an increase in the 
exchange controls by one standard deviation (0.19 and 0.24, respectively) are equal to 
100*0.19*0.37/0.78=9.0 percentage points increase in tariff rate for controls on trade 
payments, and 100*0.24*0.35/0.78=10.8 percentage points increase in tariff rate for controls 
on FX transactions. 
 
Alternative specification with time-varying price indices 
As we are not able to include time-varying importer fixed effects, we use time-varying 
import price indices for both importers and exporters from the World Economic Outlook 
database to proxy for the time-varying country-specific price factors. Import price indices are 
better than CPI indices because the theory (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) suggests an 
index of tradable goods prices, but CPI would be dominated by nontradable components.  
 
The results from this alternative specification, reported in Table 3, are mostly consistent with 
the benchmark case. When the restriction indices are included individually, all three types of 
controls have negative and significant coefficients. When they are included collectively, both 
controls on trade payments and those on FX transactions remain significant, while controls 
on capital transactions become insignificant. The point estimate for controls on trade 
payments is -0.49, implying slightly larger effect than those in the benchmark regressions. 
The coefficients for tariff rates are estimated to be about -0.72, close to those in the 
benchmark regressions. These estimates imply a tariff equivalent of 13 percentage points for 
a one-standard-deviation increase in the controls on trade payments, and 14 percentage points 
for a similar increase in the controls on FX transactions. In the last column of Table 3, (non-
time-varying) contry-pair fixed effects as well as time-varying imported goods price indices    12  
 
for exporters and importers are included in the same regression. With this specification, the 
controls on trade payments still have a negative and significant coefficient, though the 
coefficient on controls on foreign exchange transactions becomes negative and insignificant. 
For some reasons, the coefficient on controls on capital transactions becomes positive and 
significant. It is worth noting that the last column represents a fairly demanding specification 




There are reasons to think that the same exchange controls may have a smaller negative 
effect on trade for developing countries than for developed countries. For example, bribery 
and corruption at the customs may be more prevalent in developing countries so that a given 
conrol is easier to be evaded. On the other hand, trading firms in developing countries may 
have a harder time than their counterparts in developed countries in obtaining trade credit to 
overcome the exchange controls. In this case, the same exchange controls may have a larger 
negative effect. This discussion suggests that it may be useful to check if the results for 
developing countries are different for the whole sample. 
 
Table 4 focuses on a sub-sample in which both importers and exporters are developing 
countries. The results are consisitant with (though somewhat weaker than) the benchmark 
regressions. Columns 1 to 4 are regressions with importer, exporter, and year fixed effects.  
When three control measures are included separately in regressions, all of them have the 
expected negative signs with the coefficients on controls on trade payments and FX 
transactions being significant. When included jointly, all three controls have negative 
coefficients but only controls on trade payments remain significant. The point estimate for 
controls on trade payments is -0.476, slightly less than the corresponding one in the 
benchmark regression. Columns 5 – 8 are regressions with country pair fixed effects. 
Controls on trade payments have a negative coefficient which is significant only when 
included by itself. With all three controls in the same regression, controls on FX transactions 
remain negative and significant.  
    13  
 
Additional control variables 
We have considered additional control variables. The most important ones are corruption and 
trade openness. The results are reported in Table 5. All regressions include country-pair fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. Since the level of corruption is a slow-moving variable, its 
direct effect is likely captured by the country fixed effects. In Columns 1-4 of Table, we look 
at the interaction between corruption and the exchange controls. Specifically, we create a 
dummy for “more corrupt countries” if their corruption rating – based on the World Bank 
Institute’s “Control of Corruption” index – exceeds the median in the sample. In addition to 
the three exchange controls, we then add the interaction terms between each of the exchange 
control measure and the corruption dummy. The results in Columns 1-4 provide some weak 
evidence that exchange controls have a reduced negative effect on trade in relatively more 
corrupt economies. This suggests that corruption may make evasion of exchange control a bit 
easier on average. 
 
Trade openness itself may alter the effect of a given level of exchange controls on trade. A 
very high volume of trade opens up many channels to evade exchange controls through mis-
invoicing of trade. If customs inspection per unit of trade declines with the volume of trade, 
then the negative effect of exchange controls on trade may also decline
3. To examine this, we 
create a dummy for “more open economies” for countries whose trade-to-GDP ratio exceeds 
the median value. The dummy is interacted with the three exchange controls. The results are 
reported in Columns 5-8 of Table 5. The interaction terms have generally positive signs (with 
one exception). This is consistent with the notion that exchange controls have a smaller 





                                                 
3 Aizenman (2003) proposes a model in which domestic financial repression leads to incentive for capital flight. 
Trade openness facilitates capital flight precisely because of the difficulty in enforcing exchange controls when 
trade volume is big.    14  
 
Finer classification of exchange controls 
As the restriction indices are based on many indicators for different dimensions of the 
controls, a question of interest is which sub-categories of controls have greater adverse 
effects. To answer it, we break down the three indices further into finer sub-categories. The 
controls on trade payments are divided into controls over imports and those over exports. 
Note controls on exports can have a negative effect on imports and vice versa due to the 
Lerner symmetry theorem. The controls on capital transactions are broken down to eight sub-
categories that cover controls on capital and money market instruments, derivatives, FDI, 
credit operations (loans), real estates, commercial banks, institutional investors, and personal 
capital transactions. The controls on FX transactions are sub-divided into exchange taxes, 
exchange subsidies, controls on forward markets, administrative controls, controls on setting 
up bank accounts, controls on current transfers, controls on trade in gold and bank coins, and 
existence of arrears due to lack of FX.  
 
The regression results are reported in Table 6. As in the benchmark case, we place the 
controls indices one by one first, and then pool them together. For each model, we implement 
two variations, one with separate importer and exporter fixed effects, and the other with 
country pair fixed effects. Many sub-indices show a negative sign, suggesting a trade-
reducing effect. Some sub-categories are significant for all specifications, such as controls on 
export proceeds, controls on setting up bank accounts, existence of arrears due to lack of FX, 
and currency requirements for pricing/settlements. It is particularly noteworthy that controls 
over transactions of capital and money market instruments (including equity and bond 
investments) have negative and significant signs in the models with importer and exporter 
fixed effect. One caveat for the regressions with a large number of restriction sub-categories 
is that some of them are highly correlated with each others, making statistical inference 
difficult. For example, the average pair-wise correlation among the 8 indices for capital 
transactions is 0.6. Therefore, the estimates need to be interpreted with caution. 
 
A case study of the emerging market experiences in the 1990s 
To supplement the full-sample analysis, we now turn to a case study of the experiences of 
some emerging market economies that tightened exchange controls during the Asian-Latin    15  
 
American financial crisis of the late 1990s. As the increases in the controls were primarily 
motivated by a desire to stop capital outflows or otherwise reduce the chance of a speculative 
attack on their currencies, the changes in the controls were arguably exogenous with respect 
to the countries’ trade flows. 
 
We would like to work with a group of countries for which international capital flows are 
significant relative to their GDPs (at least prior to the crisis). Therefore, we start with a set of 
countries that are included in the MSCI emerging market index, and narrow down the list to 
those developing economies that raised controls on either capital transactions or FX 
transactions during 1996-1999. We are left with 11 countries (marked by # in Appendix 2). 
As it turns out, very few of them significantly altered their tariffs, NTB ratings, or even 
controls on trade payments during the period. Therefore, on an ex ante basis, we do not have 
much hope in identifying a significant effect of these three variables. Nonetheless, we hope 
to identify some effects coming from changes in the controls on capital and FX transactions. 
 
We implement a time-differenced version of Equation (1), with the change in log bilateral 
imports from 1996 to 1999 as the dependent variable. Naturally, all variables that are time-
invariant are eliminated, including the various fixed effects. Our specification is:  
 
∆Log( importi,j,t ) =  α1 ∆log(GDPi )+ α2 ∆log(GDPj ) +  ∆Restriction-Indicesi,t γ  
                                   + δ ∆Tariffi,j,t + η ∆NTBi,t+ εi,j,t   (2) 
 
where ∆ denotes a change in the relevant variable from 1996 to 1999. The regression result 
without the NTB variable is reported in the first column of Table 7. The coefficient for the 
controls on capital transactions is -1.46 and significant at the five percent level, and that for 
the controls on FX transactions is -1.28 and significant. As expected, the coefficients on tariff 
rate and controls on trade payments are not statistically different from zero. Note that a fall in 
imports due to a contraction of domestic demand is explicitly controlled for since the change 
in an importer’s GDP is a regressor. In the second column, we add change in the NTB ratings 
as an extra regressor and obtain broadly similar results. To account for the effects of    16  
 
exchange rate fluctuations on trade flows, multilateral and bilateral real exchange rates are 
included in the regression. The results are reported in column 3. The estimates for the 
exchange controls remain similar to the other regressions. These results suggest that using 
exchange controls to regulate capital flows can have the (unintended) consequence of 
harming trade. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper sets out to investigate a possible collateral damage of exchange controls, namely 
their negative effects on international trade. It indeed uncovers economically and statistically 
significant evidence of the adverse effects. An increase in the controls on foreign exchange 
transactions by one standard deviation reduces trade by the same amount as an increase in 
tariff rate by 11 percentage points. An increase in the controls on trade payments has the 
same negative effect on trade as an increase in tariff rate by 14 percentage points. The 
experience of the emerging market economies during the late 1990s suggests that controls on 
capital transactions intended to regulate capital flows also tend to harm trade substantially. 
The evidence reported in the paper suggests that the collateral damage of exchange controls 
should be a part of any assessment of the desirability of capital account liberalization (see 
Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2006, for a re-assessment of the effects of financial 
globalization). 
 
This paper represents a first step in understanding the effects of exchange controls on trade. It 
is possible that the effects are non-linear: the same measure in an already restrictive exchange 
control regime may do more harm than in a less restrictive one. The effects may vary by 
sectors: exchange controls may raise the cost of trading in heterogeneous products more than 
the cost of trading in homogeneous products. As heterogeneous products have a greater 
variance in their unit values over different varieties, it may be more difficult for traders to 
convince bureaucrats that a particular transaction is not mis-invoiced to evade exchange 
controls. In this case, exchange controls imply one more distortion by affecting a country’s 
pattern of specialization. The effects may also interact with other features of an economy: the 
same exchange controls may do either more or less damage in a governance-challenged    17  
 
economy depending on whether corruption primarily weakens the exchange controls or 
exacerbates the burden of complying with the controls. These are all fruitful topics for further 
research. 
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Appendix 1: Exchange Controls: Source, Measurement, and Indices 
 
The exchange control indices are computed by the authors based on the exchange-
restriction indicators in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) database, which in turn is compiled from the annual reporting by the 
authorities of IMF member countries. The current classification system was first used in 1996 
for a subset of countries but soon expanded to cover all member countries. This appendix 
lists these indicators and explain how the restriction indices are constructed. Formal 
definitions of these indicators are available in any issue of the AREAER. 
 
Three indices are constructed to gauge the coverage of exchange controls in three 
groups: trade payments, capital transactions, and FX transactions and other items. Each index 










= × ∑  
 
where  ,, ijt D  is an dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country i has restriction 
measured by indicator j in year t, and  j W  is the weight assigned to the indicator j. The 
weights are chosen so that the major components within each group receive same weights. 
For example, the documentation requirements for imports receive the same weight as 
financing requirements for imports, although there are 5 sub-indicators for the former and 3 
for the later. By construction, this index takes the value between 0 and 1, with a higher value 
indicating a more restrictive regime.  
 
Controls on Trade Payments 
 
1. Imports and Import Payments: 
1.1 Foreign exchange budget 
1.2 Financing requirements for imports 
a. Minimum financing requirements; b. Advance payment requirements;  c. Advance 
import deposits 
1.3. Documentation requirements for release of foreign exchange for imports 
   a. Domiciliation requirement;   b. Preshipment inspection;   c. Letters of credit 
   d. Import licenses used as exchange licenses   e. Other 
1.4. State import monopoly 
2. Exports and export proceeds: 
2.1. Repatriation requirement 
    a. Surrender requirement 
2.2. Financing requirements 
2.3. Documentation requirements 
   a. Letters of credit;   b. Guarantees;   c. Domiciliation;   d. Preshipment inspection 
   e. Other 
2.4. Export licenses    21  
 
   a. Without quotas;   b. With quotas 
2.5. Export taxes 
   a. Collected through the exchange system;   b. Other export taxes 
 
Controls on Capital Transactions: 
 
1. Controls on capital and money market instruments 
(Each category has four indicators(1) Purchase locally by nonresidents; (2) Sale or issue locally by 
nonresidents; (3) Purchase abroad by residents;  (4) Sale or issue abroad by residents) 
   1.1. On capital market securities 
      a. Shares or other securities of a participating nature 
      b. Bonds or other debt securities 
   1.2. On money market instruments 
   1.3. On collective investment securities 
2. Controls on derivatives and other instruments 
 (Including four sub-indicators(1) Purchase locally by nonresidents; (2) Sale or issue locally by 
nonresidents; (3) Purchase abroad by residents;  (4) Sale or issue abroad by residents) 
3. Controls on credit operations 
(Each has two sub-indicators:  (1) By residents to nonresidents; (2) To residents from nonresidents) 
    3.1 Commercial credits 
    3.2 Financial credits 
    3.3 Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities 
4. Controls on direct investment 
     4.1 Outward direct investment 
     4.2 Inward direct investment 
5. Controls on liquidation of direct investment 
6. Controls on real estate transactions  (Separate indicators for: a. Purchase abroad by residents; b. 
Purchase locally by nonresidents;  c. Sale locally by nonresidents) 
7. Controls on personal capital transactions 
    7.1. Loans  
a By residents to nonresidents, b  To residents from nonresidents 
    7.2. Gifts, endowments, inheritances, and legacies 
 a  By residents to nonresidents, b  To residents from nonresidents 
    7.3. Settlements of debts abroad by immigrants 
    7.4. Transfer of assets 
          a Transfer abroad by emigrants b Transfer into the country by immigrants 
    7.5. Transfer of gambling and prize earnings 
8. Provisions specific to commercial banks and other credit institutions 
  8.1. Borrowing abroad 
  8.2. Maintenance of accounts abroad 
  8.3. Lending to nonresidents (financial or commercial credits) 
  8.4. Lending locally in foreign exchange 
  8.5. Purchase of locally issued securities denominated in foreign exchange 
  8.6. Differential treatment of deposit accounts in foreign exchange 
a. Reserve requirements; b. Liquid asset requirements; c. Interest rate controls; and  d. Credit 
controls. 
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  8.7. Differential treatment of deposit accounts held by nonresidents 
a. Reserve requirements; b. Liquid asset requirements; c. Interest rate controls; and  d. Credit 
controls. 
  8.8. Investment regulations 
       a. Abroad by banks;  b. In banks by nonresidents 
  8.9. Open foreign exchange position limits 
       a. On resident assets and liabilities;   b. On nonresident assets and liabilities 
9. Provisions specific to institutional investors 
     9.1. Limits (max.) on securities issued by nonresidents 
     9.2. Limits (max.) on investment portfolio held abroad 
     9.3. Limits (min.) on investment portfolio held locally 
     9.4. Currency-matching regulations on assets/liabilities composition 
10. Other controls imposed by securities laws 
 
Controls on FX transactions and other items 
 
1. Exchange tax 
2. Exchange subsidy 
3. Forward exchange market 
    Official cover of forward operations 
4. Prescription of currency requirements 
   4.1. Controls on the use of domestic currency 
       a. For current transactions and payments 
       b. For capital transactions 
          i. Transactions in capital and money market instruments 
          ii. Transactions in derivatives and other instruments 
          iii. Credit operations 
   4.2. Use of foreign exchange among residents 
5. Administration of control 
6. Payments arrears 
    6.1. Official;    6.2. Private 
7. Controls on trade in gold (coins and/or bullions) 
    7.1. On domestic ownership and/or trade 
    7.2. On external trade 
8. Controls on exports and imports of banknotes 
   8.1. On exports 
        a. Domestic currency;        b. Foreign currency 
   8.2. On imports 
        a. Domestic currency;        b. Foreign currency 
9. Controls on the following transfers 
(Each below has three sub-categories: 1. Prior approval;  2.Quantitative limits ; 3. Indicative 
limits/bona fide test) 
    9.1. Trade-related payments 
    9.2. Investment-related payments 
    9.3. Payments for travel 
    9.4. Personal payments 
    9.5. Foreign workers' wages    23  
 
    9.6. Credit card use abroad 
    9.7. Other payments 
10 Proceeds from Invisible Transactions and Current Transfers 
  10.1 Repatriation requirements 
          Surrender requirements 
  10.2 Restrictions on use of funds 
11. Resident Accounts 
  11.1. Foreign exchange accounts permitted 
         a. Held domestically 
            Approval required 
         b. Held abroad 
            Approval required 
  11.2. Accounts in domestic currency held abroad 
  11.3. Accounts in domestic currency convertible into foreign currency 
12. Nonresident Accounts 
  12.1. Foreign exchange accounts permitted 
    Approval required 
  12.2. Domestic currency accounts 
    Convertible into foreign currency 
    Approval required 
  12.3. Blocked accounts 
    24  
 
 
Appendix 2: List of Countries in the Sample 
 
Albania Denmark      Laos  Rwanda 
Algeria  Djibouti     Latvia    Saudi Arabia   
Angola  Dominica     Lebanon    Senegal 
Antigua and Barbuda     Dominican Republic  Lithuania    Seychelles    
Argentina  Ecuador  Luxembourg     Singapore   
Armenia    Egypt  Macedonia  Slovak Republic   
Australia    El Salvador    Madagascar  Slovenia   
Azerbaijan Equatorial  Guinea      Malawi  South Africa   
Bahamas     Estonia    Malaysia #   Spain   
Bahrain     Ethiopia  Maldives    Sri Lanka #  
Bangladesh    France    Mali  St. Kitts and Nevis    
Barbados     Gabon     Malta     St. Lucia    
Belarus  Georgia  Mauritania  St. Vincent and The Grenadines   x 
Belgium    Germany    Mauritius    Sudan 
Belize     Ghana  Mexico    Suriname    
Benin  Greece  Moldova    Switzerland   
Bolivia  Grenada     Morocco #  Syria 
Brazil #  Guatemala  Mozambique  Tanzania 
Bulgaria    Guinea-Bissau     Nepal    Thailand #  
Burkina Faso  Guyana  Netherlands    Togo 
Burundi  Honduras  New Zealand    Trinidad and Tobago    
Cambodia  Hong Kong    Nicaragua    Tunisia   
Cameroon  Hungary    Niger  Turkey #  
Canada    Iceland    Nigeria  Turkmenistan    
Central African Rep  India  Norway    Uganda 
Chad  Indonesia  Oman    Ukraine 
Chile    Iran  Pakistan #   United Kingdom   
China  Ireland    Panama    United States   
Colombia    Italy    Papua New Guinea    Uruguay   
Congo, Democratic Republic of  Jamaica    Paraguay  Uzbekistan 
Congo, Republic of  Japan    Peru    Venezuela 
Costa Rica  Jordan    Philippines #  Vietnam 
Cote d' Ivoire  Kenya    Poland #   Yemen 
Croatia  Korea    Portugal    Zambia   
Cyprus     Kuwait    Romania    Zimbabwe 
Czech Republic #   Kyrgyz Republic Russian  Federation  #   
      
Note: # denotes countries in the sample used in Table 7.  
 







Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade payments 0.26 0.23 0.19 0 1
Capital transactions 0.46 0.45 0.31 0 1
FX transactions 0.32 0.27 0.24 0 0.91






Table 1b: Correlations of the Control Indices, Tariff, and NTB Index 
          
   Trade payments Capital transactions FX transactions  Tariff
NTB 
Index
Trade payments  1.00 0.62 0.70  0.44 0.21
Capital transactions  0.62 1.00 0.72  0.46 0.03
FX transactions  0.70 0.72 1.00  0.54 0.05
Tariff 0.44 0.46 0.54  1.00 0.14
NTB Index  0.21 0.03 0.05  0.14 1.00
 




Table 2: Benchmark Regressions 
           
Dependent variable: log bilateral imports           
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Controls on trade payments  -0.567    -0.537 -0.434      -0.367
  (0.153)  (0.159)(0.103)    (0.109)
Controls on capital transactions    -0.068  0.032  -0.018  0.087
   (0.107)  (0.110)  (0.069)  (0.072)
Controls on FX transactions     -0.314 -0.152   -0.438 -0.353
     (0.171)(0.180)  (0.116)(0.124)
Tariff -0.713 -0.724 -0.725 -0.717 -0.774 -0.784 -0.801 -0.784
 (0.182)(0.182)(0.182)(0.182)(0.107) (0.107)(0.107)(0.107)
Non-tariff barrier index  -0.213 -0.226 -0.221 -0.212 -0.181 -0.189 -0.186 -0.178
 (0.049)(0.048)(0.048)(0.048)(0.034) (0.034)(0.034)(0.034)
Log GDP importer  0.728 0.714 0.671 0.706 1.231  1.216 1.144 1.169
 (0.167)(0.168)(0.168)(0.168)(0.099) (0.099)(0.101)(0.101)
Log GDP exporter  0.48 0.477 0.475 0.479 0.865  0.858 0.845 0.852
 (0.165)(0.165)(0.165)(0.165)(0.091) (0.091)(0.091)(0.092)
Log  distance  -1.499 -1.499 -1.499 -1.498    
  (0.026)(0.026)(0.026)(0.026)    
Border  0.666 0.668 0.666 0.668    
  (0.165)(0.165)(0.165)(0.165)    
Ever  colony  1.007 1.008 1.008 1.008    
  (0.097)(0.097)(0.097)(0.097)    
Common  language  0.603 0.603 0.603 0.603    
  (0.049)(0.049)(0.049)(0.049)    
Importer WTO member, exporter not  -0.166 -0.184 -0.174 -0.162 0.25  0.237 0.252 0.258
 (0.089)(0.089)(0.089)(0.089)(0.055) (0.055)(0.055)(0.056)
Both countries WTO members  0.385 0.367 0.376 0.388 0.358  0.343 0.352 0.361
 (0.065)(0.066)(0.066)(0.066)(0.049) (0.049)(0.049)(0.049)
Mills ratio for non-zero trade  5.701 5.674 5.699 5.678 -0.992 -0.979 -1.028 -1.03
 (0.495)(0.499)(0.496)(0.499)(1.240) (1.241)(1.240)(1.240)
HMR predicted probability of non-zero trade  10.27 10.227 10.267 10.234 -0.556 -0.492 -0.427 -0.495
 (0.791)(0.796)(0.791)(0.795)(1.958) (1.958)(1.958)(1.958)
Importer fixed effect  yes yes yes yes no  no no no
Exporter fixed effect  yes yes yes yes no  no no no
Country pair fixed effect  no no no no yes  yes yes yes
Year fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes
# Observations  58098 58065 58098 58065 58098  58065 58098 58065
R-squared   0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02
 
Notes:           
Robust standard errors, clustered by country pairs, are in parentheses           
R-squares in the last 4 columns do not include the explanatory power of  the country pair dummies. 
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Table 3: Adding Time-varying Price Indices 
       
Dependent variable: log bilateral imports       
  1 2 3 4 5 
Controls on trade payments  -0.633    -0.494  -0.430
 (0.154)    (0.161)  (0.142)
Controls on capital transactions    -0.187  -0.033  -0.195
   (0.102) (0.108)  (0.150)
Controls on FX transactions      -0.608 -0.438  0.343
     (0.162) (0.174)  (0.111)
Tariff -0.708 -0.726 -0.728 -0.721  -0.810
 (0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182)  (0.111)
Non-tariff barrier index  -0.177 -0.197 -0.178 -0.17  -0.102
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)  (0.042)
Log GDP importer  0.916 0.912 0.881 0.891  1.669
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)  (0.144)
Log GDP exporter  1.192 1.193 1.19 1.194  0.843
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)  (0.099)
Log distance  -1.502 -1.501 -1.502 -1.501 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Border 0.651 0.652 0.651 0.653 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) 
Ever colony  1.008 1.009 1.009 1.009 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Common language  0.604 0.604 0.603 0.604 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Importer WTO member, exporter not  -0.122 -0.141 -0.134 -0.12  0.217
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087)  (0.078)
Both countries WTO member  0.37 0.351 0.356 0.37  0.353
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)  (0.072)
HMR predicted probability of non-zero trade 10.522 10.481 10.521 10.486  0.862
 (0.797) (0.802) (0.797) (0.802)  (1.976)
Mills ratio for non-zero trade  5.839 5.813 5.837 5.815  -0.046
 (0.499) (0.503) (0.500) (0.503)  (1.264)
Import price index, importing country  yes yes yes yes  yes
Import price index, exporting country  yes yes yes yes  yes
Country pair fixed effect  no no no no  yes
Year fixed effect  yes yes yes yes  yes
Observations 56711 56678 56711 56678  56678
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76  0.03
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by importers, are in parentheses. R-squared in the last column 








Table 4: Developing Countries 
          
Dependent variable: log bilateral imports        
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Controls on trade payments  -0.549    -0.476-0.315    -0.183 
  (0.20)  (0.21) (0.14)  (0.15) 
Controls  on  capital  transactions   -0.148 -0.053 -0.041    0.066 
   (0.15) (0.16) (0.10)   (0.10) 
Controls on FX transactions     -0.438-0.228  -0.607  -0.567 
    (0.25) (0.26)  (0.18)  (0.19) 
Tariff -0.725-0.732-0.735-0.727-0.902-0.909 -0.923 -0.915 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Non-tariff barrier index  -0.205-0.218 -0.21-0.206-0.165 -0.17 -0.166 -0.162 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Log GDP importer  1.234 1.217 1.148 1.194 1.746 1.736  1.617  1.631 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Log GDP exporter  0.272 0.267 0.27 0.27 0.288 0.287  0.267  0.269 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Log  distance  -1.807-1.808-1.808-1.807    
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)    
Border  0.552 0.552 0.552 0.553    
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)    
Ever  colony  1.02 1.023 1.02 1.023    
  (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52)    
Common  language  0.903 0.901 0.902 0.901    
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    
Importer WTO member, exporter not  -0.086-0.103-0.092-0.078 0.205 0.194  0.217  0.22 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
Both countries WTO member  0.413 0.397 0.406 0.42 0.24 0.23  0.24  0.243 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
HMR predicted probability of non-zero trade 8.135 8.08 8.131 8.088 2.709 2.733  2.835  2.809 
 (0.86) (0.87) (0.86) (0.87) (2.37) (2.37)  (2.37)  (2.37) 
Mills ratio for non-zero trade  5.417 5.383 5.416 5.385 0.209 0.223  0.152  0.149 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (1.47) (1.47)  (1.47)  (1.47) 
Import country fixed effect  yes yes yes yes no no  no  no 
Export country fixed effect  yes yes yes yes no no  no  no 
Country pair fixed effect  no no no no yes yes  yes  yes 
Year fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes  yes 
Observations 30411 30397 30411 30397 30411 30397  30411  30397 
R-squared 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.02 0.02  0.03  0.03 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by importers, are in parentheses       
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Table 5: Additional Controls: Corruption and Trade Openness 
          
Dependent variable: log bilateral imports          
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Controls on trade payments  -0.448    -0.063  -0.606     -0.418
  (0.108)  (0.131)  (0.121)    (0.154)
Controls on capital transactions    -0.05  0.05   -0.054  0.182
   (0.072) (0.082)   (0.072) (0.085)
Controls on FX transactions      -0.56 -0.689     -0.47 -0.469
    (0.122) (0.144)    (0.116) (0.134)
Controls on trade payments in more corrupt countries  0.026    -0.571        
  (0.059)  (0.139)      
Controls on capital transactions in less corrupt countries  0.061  0.05        
   (0.036) (0.093)      
Controls on FX transactions in more corrupt countries    0.149 0.495        
    (0.048) (0.122)      
Controls on trade payments in more open countries        0.235     0.004
      (0.086)    (0.161)
Controls on capital transactions in more open countries          0.092  -0.186
       (0.048) (0.097)
Controls on FX transactions in more  open  countries        0.218 0.463
        (0.068) (0.130)
Tariff -0.773 -0.782 -0.797 -0.781 -0.787 -0.788 -0.82 -0.814
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)  (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Non-tariff barrier index  -0.18 -0.186 -0.176 -0.171 -0.178 -0.189 -0.186 -0.177
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Log  GDP  importer  1.233 1.218 1.154 1.174 1.209 1.199 1.113 1.132
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) (0.102)  (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) (0.102)
Log GDP exporter  0.865 0.86 0.848 0.863  0.86  0.856 0.842 0.85
 (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092)  (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092)
Importer WTO member, exporter not  0.248 0.229 0.235 0.237  0.251  0.237 0.247 0.248
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)  (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
Both countries WTO member  0.356 0.336 0.337 0.343  0.357  0.343 0.347 0.352
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
HMR predicted probability of non-zero trade  -0.56 -0.495 -0.447 -0.493 -0.529 -0.507 -0.428 -0.467
 (1.958) (1.958) (1.958) (1.957)  (1.958) (1.958) (1.958) (1.958)
Mills ratio for non-zero trade  -0.994 -0.972 -1.026 -0.97 -1.006 -1.003 -1.043 -1.023
 (1.240) (1.241) (1.240) (1.240)  (1.240) (1.241) (1.240) (1.240)
Country  pair  fixed  effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year  fixed  effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  58098 58065 58098 58065 58098 58065 58098 58065
R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: R-squares do not account for the explanatory power of the country-pair fixed effects.       
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Table 6: Finer Classification of Exchange Controls   
  1 2  3 4 5 6  7  8   
Tariff -0.729 -0.727 -1.052 -1.145 -0.764 -0.767 -0.909 -0.867 
 (0.196) (0.204) (0.211) (0.245) (0.111) (0.119) (0.124) (0.141) 
Non-tariff barrier index  -0.197 -0.197 -0.194 -0.189 -0.179 -0.161 -0.154 -0.173 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.053) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) 
Multiple exchange rates  0.019 -0.014 -0.02 -0.083 0.088 0.062 0.082 0.025 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.031) (0.036) (0.034) (0.039) 
Controls related to exports  -0.518    -0.471 -0.493    -0.443 
 (0.117)    (0.208) (0.077)    (0.160) 
Controls related to imports  -0.468    -0.298 -0.348    -0.118 
 (0.131)    (0.261) (0.094)    (0.183) 
Exchange  taxes   -0.148 -0.049  0.006  0.046 
   (0.077) (0.095) (0.060)  (0.079) 
Exchange  subsidies   -0.16  -0.153 -0.18  -0.119 
   (0.072) (0.092) (0.048)  (0.065) 
Absence  of  currency  forward  markets   0.025 0.031 0.009  -0.003 
   (0.048) (0.049) (0.038)  (0.039) 
Administrative  control   -0.041 -0.019  0.001  -0.023 
   (0.056) (0.059) (0.047)  (0.049) 
Restrictions on opening   -0.055  -0.048  -0.106  -0.103 
             domestic/fx bank accounts    (0.079)  (0.089)  (0.064)  (0.075) 
Arrears unsettled due to lack of FX    -0.299  -0.21  -0.46  -0.317 
   (0.071) (0.082) (0.046)  (0.063) 
Selling/buying gold and banknotes    0.107  0.118  0.1  0.08 
   (0.051) (0.052) (0.037)  (0.040) 
Currency requirements for pricing  -0.078  -0.086  -0.059  -0.068 
             /settlement/etc    (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
Payments/proceeds for invisible transactions  0.136  0.549  0.163  0.287 
              & transfers    (0.129)  (0.161)  (0.092)  (0.119) 
Transactions on capital & money  -0.187 -0.199    -0.052 -0.059 
             market instruments      (0.064) (0.068)    (0.050) (0.053) 
Controls on credit operations      0.044 -0.042    0.06 0.026 
     (0.060) (0.072)    (0.048) (0.058) 
Controls on derivatives transactions     -0.147 -0.059    -0.113 -0.047 
     (0.055) (0.059)    (0.045) (0.050) 
Controls on real estate transactions      -0.065 -0.069    -0.068 -0.058 
     (0.051) (0.055)    (0.039) (0.043) 
Controls on FDI      0.114 0.163    0.041 0.081 
     (0.041) (0.041)    (0.032) (0.035) 
Restrictions on institutional investors    0.121 0.1    0.076 0.058 
     (0.042) (0.047)    (0.032) (0.036) 
Controls on personal capital transactions      0.106 0.155    0.135 0.195 
     (0.059) (0.073)    (0.039) (0.055) 
# Observations  57621 51964 46925 43411 57621 51964 46925 43411 
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Notes: 1/ Regressions 1-3 have country fixed effects, and regressions 4-6 have country –pair fixed effects. All other regressors in Table 2 
are also included but not reported. 
            2/ R-squares in the last three columns do not account for the explanatory power of the country-pair fixed effects.      31  
 
 
Table 7: Emerging Market Economies during 1996-99 
 (Countries that increased controls either on capital or FX transactions) 
          
          
Dependent variable = change in log bilateral imports from 96 to 99    
  1   2   
 
3 
Change in controls on trade payments  0.456  0.396  0.240
  (0.351) (0.346)  (0.380)
Change in controls on capital transactions  -1.463  -1.578  -1.364
  (0.322) (0.529)  (0.351)
Change in controls on FX transactions  -1.275  -1.194  -1.394
  (0.441) (0.396)  (0.453)
Change in log importer’s GDP   0.635  0.709  0.401
  (0.243) (0.271)  (0.360)
Change in log exporter’s GDP   1.219  1.225  1.239
  (0.432) (0.434)  (0.425)
Change in tariff  0.265  0.248  0.313
  (0.162) (0.189)  (0.201)
Change in NTB index      0.055  0.166
     (0.107)  (0.111)
Multilateral real exchange rate         0.250
         (0.479)
Bilateral real exchange rate         0.451
         (0.242)
# Observations  1142  1142  1142
R-squared 0.01  0.01  0.02
 
 